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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. : 
MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, : Case No. 860030 
: Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, plead guilty to one 
count of Aggravated Sexual Assault, a First Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-405 (1953 as amended). Before 
sentencing, the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. That 
motion was denied and judgment was entered against Mr. Gallegos in 
Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, Presiding. The same court 
sentenced the appellant to incarceration in the Utah State Prison 
for a term of from 10 years to life. From the proceedings in the 
lower court, this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 14, 1985, the appellant, Marty Lee Gallegos, 
entered a plea of guilty to one count of Aggravated Sexual Assault, 
a First Degree Felony (R. 22-23). Two other charges against the 
appellant, involving the same victim, were dismissed in exchange for 
this plea (R. 24). On September 6, 1985, Mr. Gallegos was ordered 
to undergo a ninety day evaluation to provide the trial court with 
further information prior to sentencing (R. 25-27). 
While Mr. Gallegos was undergoing the ninety-day 
evaluation, defense counsel was informed that the alleged victim had 
recanted her story (R. 80, 86). In her affidavit the alleged 
victim, who was the State's key witness, stated: "I lied on those 
previous occasions due to pressure from my parents." (R. 41) 
After informing the prosecution of this development, defense counsel 
filed a motion on November 25, 1985 to withdraw the guilty plea (R. 
29-30) (See Addendum A). A memorandum in support of the motion was 
also filed (R. 31-36). 
The motion to withdraw the guilty plea was heard by the 
trial court on December 4, 1985 (R. 79). At that time the court 
also had before it affidavits from the parties stating their 
respective positions (R. 37-42) (See Addendum B). At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the trial 
court and the prosecution was given time to respond (R. 93). 
On December 13, 1985, the trial court denied the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea (R. 97-98) (Addendum C). The court then 
imposed judgment and sentenced Mr. Gallegos to a term of 
incarceration in the Utah State Prison (R. 101). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by denying the 
Appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Once 
the alleged victim had recanted her story and had admitted that the 
Appellant was innocent of all assault charges, the court below was 
presented with ample "good cause" for allowing the Petitioner to 
withdraw his guilty plea and requiring the prosecution to proceed. 
The timeliness of the Appellant's motion ensured that no harm would 
befall the prosecution or the plea bargaining system. The court 
below committed egregious reversible error when it concluded that 
furthering judicial economy was more important than upholding the 
Appellant's constitution right to trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILT* PLEA. 
Under Utah law, a criminal defendant who pleads guilty may 
subsequently withdraw that plea "upon good cause shown and with 
leave of court." Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1953 as amended). A 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the trial court's 
discretion and denial of the motion will be reversed on appeal only 
when an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. State v. Hanson, 627 
P.2d 53, 54-5 (Utah 1981); State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Utah 
1977); State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977). While this 
Court has never established guidelines for determining when 
withdrawal of a plea should be granted, both the Federal courts and 
the jurisdictions surrounding Utah agree that presentence motions to 
withdraw guilty pleas should be granted if the defendant can show 
"any fair and just reason" for doing so. See, e.g., United States 
v. Hancock, 607 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1979); Barker v. United States, 
579 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 
208 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wahl v. State, 691 P.2d 1048 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1984); Love v. State, 630 P.2d 21 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981); State v. 
Huttinger, 595 P.2d 363 (Mont. 1979); People v. Martinez, 535 P.2d 
926 (Colo. 1975); State v. Jackson, 532 P.2d 926 (Idaho 1975); State 
v. Corvello, 363 P.2d 903 (Ariz. 1962). These jurisdictions concur 
that presentence withdrawal requests should be liberally granted.1 
In the present case, the Appellant moved the court below to 
withdraw his guilty plea 12 days prior to the date set for 
sentencing (R. 29, 32) (Addendum A). The basis for the motion was 
the alleged victim's recantation of the rape testimony she had 
delivered at Appellant's preliminary hearing. This recantation 
constituted new evidence which was unavailable at the time the plea 
was entered. The recanted testimony rendered the charges against 
the Appellant suspect and thereby provided "good cause,11 or a "fair 
and just reason" for allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
At the time the Appellant entered his guilty plea, the 
trial court carefully ascertained that the plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily made (R. 45). Appellant contends the court was far less 
xThe reason for the distinction between a presentence withdrawal and 
a post sentence withdrawal is explained in Kadwell v. United states, 
315 P.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963) quoted in 2 C. Wright & A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, §538 at 473 (1969): 
This distinction rests upon practical considerations 
important to the proper administration of justice. Before 
sentencing, the inconvenience to court and prosecution 
resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as 
compared with the public interest in protecting the right 
of the accused to trial by jury. But if a plea of guilty 
could be retracted with ease after sentence, the accused 
might be encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of 
potential punishment, and withdraw the plea if the sentence 
were unexpectedly severe. The result would be to undermine 
respect for the courts and fritter away the time and 
painstaking effort devoted to the sentencing process, 
[footnote omitted]. 
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than careful, however, when it denied the motion for withdrawal 
based on the technical and dangerously speculative grounds that no 
new evidence had been discovered and that the purported victim may 
have been coerced into changing her story (R. 98). In so ruling, 
the trial court subordinated a defendant's right to trial to the 
substantially less compelling state interest in maintaining an 
efficient plea system.2 Such abuse of discretion mandates 
reversal.3 
A. APPELLANT HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A 
TRIAL ON THE MERITS. 
The United States Constitution affords criminal defendants 
a certain limited right to withdraw their guilty pleas. As Justice 
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, noted in his 
concurrence in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971): 
There is no need to belabor the fact 
that the Constitution guarantees to all 
criminal defendants the right to a trial by 
judge or jury, or put another way, the 
"right not to plead guilty," United States 
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581, 20 L.Ed. 2d 
138, 145, 88 S.Ct. 1209 (1968). This and 
other federal rights may be waived through a 
guilty plea, but such waivers are not 
lightly presumed and, in fact, are viewed 
with the "utmost solicitude". Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274, 
279, 89 S.Ct. 1790 (1969). Given this, I 
believe that where the defendant presents a 
^The Appellant is not arguing that this Court should espouse a 
policy which would effectively grant automatic approval to all 
defendants wishing to retract their pleas. Rather, the Appellant's 
request is that this Court recognize the present case as an 
exceptional circumstance which compels the equitable declaration 
that the petitioner may withdraw his plea. 
^Even if the victim's recantation in this case doesn't amount to 
newly discovered evidence, the equities demand that the Appellant be 
afforded his day in court. 
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reason for vacating his plea and the 
government has not relied on the plea to its 
disadvantage, the plea may be vacated and 
the right to trial regained, at least where 
the motion to vacate is made prior to 
sentence and judgment. In other words, in 
such circumstances I would not deem the 
earlier plea to have irrevocably waived the 
defendant's federal constitutional right to 
a trial. 
Here, petitioner never claimed any 
automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea 
before sentencing. Rather, he tendered a 
specific reason why, in his case, the plea 
should be vacated. (Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the Appellant tendered the most 
compelling of "specific reasons" (substantiated by the State's 
former key witness) for permitting withdrawal of his plea: 
innocence. In light of Justice Marshall's remarks, it is 
questionable whether the Appellant was afforded the full measure of 
his Boykin rights. 
The Boykin standard, which requires an inquiry into the 
factual basis of a guilty plea, is designed to ensure a court that a 
defendant actually committed a crime at least as serious as the one 
to which he is pleading guilty. If a trial court is presented with 
evidence which seriously questions its factual basis determination 
prior to sentencing, a defendant must be afforded his right to a 
trial on the merits. Where the State's key witness admits to lying 
after the factual inquiry has already been completed, and where that 
lie substantially induced the defendant's plea, the Boykin process 
has been subverted. The trial court must resolve such a dilemma in 
favor of the defendant's withdrawal request. 
-6-
The Appellant's plea in the present case was voluntary in 
that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty. However, at 
the time the plea was entered it was unforeseeable that the victim 
would recant her testimony. The circumstances under which the 
Appellant's plea was entered reasonably indicate that the plea was 
not an admission of guilt, but rather was entered out of fear of 
receiving a greater sentence if the case went to trial. Such a 
situation compells compassion. If any possibility exists that the 
Appellant's actions in the victim's house on July 3, 1985, did not 
reach the level of criminal culpability, the Appellant must be 
afforded the opportunity to proceed to trial. Any doubts as to the 
fairness of the plea should be resolved in favor of the defendant 
and of a trial on the merits. State v. Koepplin, 689 P.2d 921 
(Mont. 1984); State v. Nelson, 603 P.2d 1050, 1051 (Mont. 1979). 
B. APPELLANT DEMONSTRATED BELOW A PAIR AND 
JUST REASON FOR GRANTING HIS MOTION. 
If the defendant can show "the existence of any fair and 
just reason, he should be permitted to withdraw his plea, even if 
the plea was voluntary." Wahl v. State, 691 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1981). In those jurisdictions which liberally grant a 
presentence withdrawal motion, three key factors are scrutinized 
prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion: 
In each case, the reason given by the 
defendant for withdrawal of a plea must be 
examined in light of . . . the extent of 
delay in making the request, the amount of 
prejudice to the prosecution, and the 
possibility that the request constitutes an 
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attempt by the defendant to manipulate the 
proceedings to obtain an unfair tactical 
advantage.4 
Wahl 691 P.2d at 1051. 
The Appellant caused no delay to any proceeding below 
because his motion was filed well in advance of his sentencing date 
and immediately after the alleged victim recanted. Further, unless 
asserting the truth and recanting lies can be deemed manipulation of 
our criminal justice system, neither the alleged victim nor the 
Appellant manipulated the proceedings below. 
Similarly, no prejudice to the prosecution arose simply 
because the alleged victim recanted her previous story. Any showing 
of prejudice by the prosecution must be substantial for the motion 
to withdraw a plea to be denied. Love v. State, 630 P.2d 21 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1981). Specifically, in Williams v. State, 655 P.2d 779 
(Alaska 1982), the court denied a motion to withdraw a plea because 
the prosecution proved that a number of material witnesses were 
unavailable. In Wahl v. State, 691 P.2d 1048 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1984), the Williams rationale was upheld where the prosecution 
showed it would have to subpoena over twenty witnesses, including 
several experts from out of state. 
4In accord with this standard, the ABA Project on Standards for 
Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty (2d ed. 1980) §2.1(a) states: 
"After entry of a plea of guilty . . . and before sentencing, the 
court should allow the defendant to withdraw the plea for any fair 
and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially 
prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea." 
8 
In the present case, prejudice of a sufficient nature 
simply does not exist. The prosecution's sole claim of prejudice 
raised in the proceedings below was that the alleged victim's 
recantation seriously damaged their case (R. 47). This claim of 
prejudice is meritless. The fact that the truth may undermine the 
state's case can hardly be deemed prejudicial. 
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the Appellant 
acknowledges the state's legitimate concern that pleas not be taken 
lightly. However, in cases such as the present one, general concern 
for the integrity of guilty pleas must yield to the paramount 
importance of the defendant's right to insist that the prosecution 
be required to meet its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt at trial. Wahl, 691 P.2d at 1053. The real danger in the 
present case is that the Appellant pled guilty based on the 
irrefutable lies of the alleged victim and is now bound to that 
plea even though the lies were recanted prior to sentencing. 
Fundamental fairness dictates that the Appellant be granted his day 
in court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant 
Appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The 
court was timely presented with substantial evidence of the 
Appellant's innocence. Egregious reversible error was therefore 
committed when the court subordinated the Appellant's constitutional 
right to trial to the state's interest in upholding guilty pleas, 
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preserving the finality of criminal proceedings and furthering 
judicial economy. This is especially true since granting the motion 
would not have resulted in unfair prejudice to the prosecution or 
unfair advantage for the Appellant. Petitioner requests this Court 
to order that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea be granted. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this S^f^day of March, 1986. 
V Kv~o,j )s^> h , v \ ^ ' 
KHRIS HARROLD 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, KHRIS HARROLD, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
34114, this=QutKday of March, 1986. 
VJW-A , V\
 A toA \-> 
KHRIS HARROLD 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED by this day 
March, 1986. 
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KHRIS HARROLD (#1394) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 5 3 2-5 444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO WITHDRAW A PLEA 
OF GUILTY 
Plaintiff : 
-v- : 
MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, : Case No. CR85-807 
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) 
Defendant : 
The Defendant, MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, bv and through his 
attorney, KHRIS HARROLD, herein moves this Court to allow a 
withdrawal of a plea of guilty in case number CR85-807. 
This motion is submitted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§77-13-6 (1953 as amended) and is based upon recently discovered 
evidence which was unknown at the time of the entry of the plea. 
D^TED t h i s ^ S ^ day of November, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KHRIS HARROLD 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this day of November, 1985. 
NOW 885 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the above 
entitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on the 
t-V*V day of ^ ^og.vwVo ^  > 1985, at the hour °V.ftQ &..m. 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District 
Court Judge. Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED thi3<&S>*Al day of November, 1985. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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NLlVifcu* FILED IN C L t H ^ o - -Salt Lake County. Utan 
KHRIS HARROLD (#1394) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. CR85-807 
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
1. MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, being first duly sworn and 
upon my oath do depose and state that the following facts are 
true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief: 
L. I am the defendant in the above-entitled case. 
2. That I plead guilty to one count of Aggravated 
Sexual Assault on August 14, 1985. 
3. That I did so upon the advice of mv attorney. 
4. That my primary reason for entering a plea was 
to avoid a conviction and possible consecutive sentences. 
5. That I now wish to withdraw my guilty plea. 
DATED this ? — d a y of December , 1935 . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ,?* day of 
December, 1985. 
ZA C£^^C/ NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires 
3-i*-26, 
-?-
FILED IN CLERICS OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
KHRIS HARROLD (#1394) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : AFFIDAVIT 
Plaintiff 
-v- : 
MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, : Case No. CR85-807 
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) 
Defendant : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
* ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, GINA ANDERSON, being first duly sworn and upon my 
oath do depose and state that- the following facts are true 
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief: 
1. That I am the alleged victim in the above-entitled 
case. 
2. That I wish to recant both previous statements 
and previous testimony in the above-entitled case. 
3. That I lied on those previous occasions due to 
pressure from my parents. 
DATED this 3 day of December, 1985. 
DEC 4 1985 
Deputy Clerk 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this<3 day of 
December, 1985. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake Covinty 
My Commission Expires 
3 -/yva> 
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Salt Lake County, uian 
DEC 4 1985 
KHRIS HARROLD (#1394) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Deputy Clerk 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-v-
MARTY LEE GALLEGOS, 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. Cr35-807 
(Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) 
) 
: SS . 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, KHRIS HARROLD, being first duly sworn and upon my 
oath do depose and state that the following facts are true 
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief: 
1. I am the attorney of record for the defendant 
in the above-entitled matter. 
2. That I advised the defendant to plead guilty 
to one count of Aggravated Sexual Assault in the above-entitled 
case. 
3. That I did so based upon the facts available to 
me at the time of entry of the plea, including testimony 
of the alleged victim at the preliminary hearing. 
DATED this ,-g)\vk day of December, 1985. 
KHRIS" HARROLD 
Attorney for Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
 c?
 r
^ day of 
December, 1985. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
f v 
My Commission Expires : 
3 /?-^ 
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ADDENDUM C 
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County of Salt Lake State of Utah 
RLE NO: 
TITLE: (Parties Present) : COUNSEL: (Counsel Present) 
£?. SJu^Juct^ Z^ &8TATF OF UTAH 
^<L/&4*^fo #. /^M^f^~ 
HOMhH h WILKINSON G.A. CHILDS 
ALAN SMI IH" 
GHOVER MEDLEY" 
.Clerk 
.Reporter 
.Bailiff 
HON: 
DATE: Alt/ /•&.. /<?rlr 
Judgt 
D Based upon motion of. 
counsel for the 
orders the • reset / • continued to 
_ the court hereby 
for 
the reason of. 
D The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's 
own motion and good cause appearing therefore, it is ordered that said defendant be granted a further stay of 
execution of sentence to 
• The above named defendant having been granted a stay of execution of sentence to this date. Now on the court's 
own motion and good cause appearing therefor, it is ordered that the probation of said defendant is terminated and 
he is released from supervision. 
D Based on non-appearance of defendent, . / • Recommendation of APPD and 
on D motion of the County Attorney or • Court's own motion, it is ordered that a bench warrant issue for said deft. 
returnable forthwith • No Bail • Bail $ 
on 
Court Orders Bench Warrant 
is hereby recalled and 
• Based on representation of _ - „ ™ ™ _ _ = _ M -
heretofore issued against defendant _ _ _ 
dismissed. 
• Based upon entry of defendant's plea in case no: and / • on motiorrtH 
counsel for the State / D Defendant, it is ordered that the above entitled case be and same is dismissed. 
D Based on motion of D counsel for state • defendant it is ordered that the above entitled case be and the 
same is dismissed for the reason of _ _ _ . 
D Comes now the above named defendant and being represented by counsel as appears above and moves the court 
and is granted leave to withdraw his plea of not guilty heretofor entered. Whereupon, the defendant now enters a 
plea of guilty to the crime of and waives time for 
passing of sentence and same is set for. 
• Based on the Court's motion, it is ordered that deft, be committed to_ 
• for 90-day evaluation period • for an additional 90-day evaluation period, and sentencing date is set for. 
• Placed copy of M.E. in APPD Box 
r f t 0 C ^ 
